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BOOK REVIEWS
THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS. By Michaelj.
Peny.' New Haven: Yale University Press. 1982. Pp. 241. $24.00.
WILLIAM B. FISCH*
The power of the courts to declare acts of government unconsitutional
has been axiomatic in American law since Marbuy v. Madison, 2 and histori-
cal research has failed to shake its foundations.3 Serious debate has cen-
tered instead on its scope, and at the most theoretical level, on the issue of
interpretation: when dealing with the more open-ended clauses in the Con-
stitution, such as "due process," "freedom of speech," "privileges and im-
munities," and "equal protection of the laws," to what sources may the
courts look for guidance? More particularly, is the judiciary bound in every
age by the understanding of the Constitution's provisions held by its
framers?
More or less affirmative answers to this question have gone by various
labels: "strict construction,".4 "neutral principles,"5. "interpretivism,"'
* Isidor Loeb Professor of Law, University of Missouri-Columbia.
1. Professor of Law, Northwestern University. A.B. 1968, Georgetown Uni-
versity; J.D. 1973, Columbia University.
2. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
3. See, e.g., J. GOEBEL, ANTECEDENTS AND BEGINNINGS TO 1801, at 308-23
(1971) (showing that the most widely publicized opponents of the Constitution
shared with its proponents the assumption that the Court would have such power).
4. This was President Richard Nixon's term for the judicial philosophy he
intended to promote with his Supreme Court appointments, beginning with Chief
Justice Burger in 1969; for an account of the politics of the early Nixon nominations
see R. EVANS & R. NOVAK, NIXON IN THE WHITE HOUSE 159-72 (1971).
5. See Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L.
REV. 1 (1959), reprinted in PRINCIPLES, POLITICS AND FUNDAMENTAL LAw 3 (1961).
A principled decision, in the sense I have in mind, is one which rests on
reasons with respect to all the issues in the case, reasons that in their gener-
ality and their neutrality transcend any immediate result that is involved.
When no sufficient reasons of this kind can be assigned for overturning
value choices of the other branches of the Government or of a state, those
choices must, of course, survive.
Id at 27. Wechsler denied, however, id at 26, that he wished to impose on the Bill
of Rights "limits fixed by the consensus of a century long past, with problems very
different from our own." Bork tied the notion more explicitly to "choices made in
the framing of the Constitution." Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment
Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 10-11 (1971).
6. See Ely, Constitutional Interpretivism: Its Allure and Impossibility, 53 IND. LJ.
399, 399 (1978): "['Interpretivism' indicates] that judges deciding constitutional is-
sues should confine themselves to enforcing values or norms that are stated or very
clearly implicit in the written Constitution . ..."
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"originalism."' Usually they reflect the assumption that the Constitution is
being applied by a politically unaccountable Court as a trump against cur-
rent local or national political majorities; the argument is that such majori-
ties should be given the benefit of the doubt. A negative answer is more
indeterminate, of course, since it leaves open to argument just what addi-
tional sources may be consulted; but the most famous expression of it is
Marshall's dictum that "we must never forget that it is a constitution that we
are expounding."
8
Throughout the United States Supreme Court's history one can iden-
tify controversial cases which have given fresh impetus to this debate. Did
the framers intend to give Congress the power to establish a national bank
and to immunize it from state law, as in McCulloch v. May/and?9 Did they
intend to preclude blacks from acquiring citizenship, as in Dred Scott v. San-
ford?x° Did they expect the due process clause to prevent significant regula-
tion of economic activity in the public interest, as in Lochner v. New York?"1
Was the equal protection clause meant to prohibit racial segregation in
public schools, as in Brown v. Board of Education, 12 or authorize judicial regu-
lation of legislative apportionment, as in Baker v. Carr?3 Was the ninth
7. See Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L.
REV. 204, 204 (1980): "By 'originalism' I mean the familiar approach to constitu-
tional adjudication that accords binding authority to the text of the Constitution or
the intentions of its adopters."
8. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819) (emphasis
added).
9. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). See the contemporary criticism and re-
sponse in JOHN MARSHALL'S DEFENSE OF MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND (G. Gun-
ther ed. 1969).
10. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1858). The decision is given substantial credit for
causing the Civil War by invalidating the Missouri Compromise. See, e.g., H. HY-
MAN & W. WIECEK, EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW 180-202 (1982).
11. 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (invalidating state maximum-hour legislation). For crit-
ical anticipation of this line of cases invalidating economic regulation, see Thayer,
The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129
(1893). An account of contemporary criticism of this and other applications of the
substantive due process doctrine is found in L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW § 8-6 (1978).
12. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Perhaps the most frequently cited contributions to the
debate on judicial review following this decision were A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DAN-
GEROUS BRANCH (1962); L. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 1-30 (1958); Wechsler,
supra note 5.
13. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). For comment critical and supportive of Baker and its
progency establishing the "one peson, one vote" principle, see Kelly, Clio and the
Court: An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 SuP. CT. REV. 119; McKay, Reapportionment: Success
Stog, ofthe Warren Court, 67 MICH. L. REV. 223 (1968). Extensive documentation for
the proposition that the framers of the fourteenth amendment did not intend to
include the right to vote within the scope of the equal protection clause, and that
therefore these decisions are wrong, is offered in R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JU-
[Vol. 48
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amendment intended to authorize the creation of a right to have and per-
form abortions, as held in Roe v. Wade? 4 Would the framers have under-
stood the tenth amendment as immunizing the states from federal
regulation otherwise proper, merely because they are states, as claimed in
National League of Cities v. User?"'
In the decade since Roe the literature on the policymaking role of the
courts-already too vast to catalogue-has flourished anew with innumera-
ble major law review articles' 6 and a clutch of monographs by law profes-
sors. 17 Two of the latter jointly received the 1983 Triennial Order of the
Coif Award for contribution to legal scholarship: John Hart Ely's Democracy
and Distrust and Jesse Choper'sJudicial Review and the National Political Pro-
cess, both published in 1980 and both advocating a narrowing of the scope
of judicial review in order to preserve a core of protection for individual
DICIARY 69-98 (1977). See the response in J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 116-
125 (1980), and Berger's reply in Berger, E.y5 "Theoy ofjudicial Review," 42 OHIO
ST. L.J. 87 (1981).
14. 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (invalidating anti-abortion laws on the basis of a newly
articulated right of privacy). The leading case for the existence of such a right was
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (protecting the right to obtain
contraceptives).
15. 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (holding that imposition of federal minimum wage
laws on local governments as employers violated tenth amendment's reservation of
powers to states). After intervening decisions had authorized the so-called "carrot-
and-stick" method of inducing states to enact regulations in order to avoid imposi-
tion of federal ones, see FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982), and had excluded
operation of a railroad from the "essential state functions" exempt from federal
regulation, see United Transp. Union v. Long Island Ry., 455 U.S. 678 (1982), the
Court has now virtually limited Usery to its facts by permitting the application of
federal age-discrimination laws to state employment in EEOC v. Wyoming, 103 S.
Ct. 1054 (1983).
16. Among the more frequently cited are Bork, The Impossibility of Finding Wel-
fare Rights in the Constitution, 1979 WASH. U.L.Q. 695; Brest, supra note 7; Ely, The
Wages of Cging Wof A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973); Greena-
walt, The Enduring Significance of Neutral Principles, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 982 (1978);
Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703 (1975);
Monaghan, Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1975);
Monaghan, Of 'Liberty" and "Property' 62 CORNELL L.J. 405 (1977). See also Sympo-
sium: JudicialReview versus'Democray, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (1981); Cover, The Origins of
Judicial Activism in the Protection of Minorities, 91 YALE LJ. 1287 (1982); Tushnet,
Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96
HARV. L. REV. 781 (1983). A new symposium has appeared which consists of 11
articles devoted to the book by Perry here reviewed. Judicial Review and the Constitu-
tion--The Text and Byond, 8 U. DAYTON L. REv. 443 (1983).
17. See, e.g., R. BERGER, supra note 13; C. BLACK, JR., DECISION ACCORDING
TO LAW (1981); J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL
PROCESS (1980); J. ELY, supra note 13; J. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE
COURTS, AND HuMAN RIGHTS (1982).
1983)
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rights. In the work here reviewed, Michael J. Perry, drawing and ex-
panding on a number of earlier essays, l" offers his own painstaking but
more generous defense of the function of judicial review in its most expan-
sive form.
Professor Perry uses the "interpretivism/noninterpretivism" terminol-
ogy popularized largely by Ely.1 9 He assumes that the legitimacy of "inter-
pretive reivew"-that based on values clearly established by the framers-is
not seriously questioned, since the Constitution was clearly intended to bind
all government (pp. 11-17). He argues, however, that none of the contro-
versial decisions of the Supreme Court in this century can be defended as
interpretive review. He accepts the conclusion most recently documented
by Raoul Berger,2 ° for example, that the draftsmen of the post-Civil War
amendments intended only to eliminate overt racial discrimination in re-
spect of citizenship, voting, and other fundamental rights, but not to pro-
hibit segregation (pp. 68-69). Thus Perry rejects attempts to distinguish
Brown from Roe in terms of constitutional legitimacy: if the Court exceeded
its authority in the latter, it did so in the former as well (pp. 1-2). The
legitimacy of "noninterpretive review"--judicial constitutional review on
the basis of values not established by the framers (p. x)-is therefore "the
central problem of contemporary constitutional theory" (p. 10).
To what extent was noninterpretive review contemplated by the fram-
ers themselves? Berger 2' has argued that they clearly intended to preclude
it, because they expressly rejected a proposal that would have authorized a
judicial veto: Perry simply notes that rejection of noninterpretive review
does not follow from rejection of an absolute veto (p. 21). Ely,22 on the
other hand, claims that a limited range for arguably noninterpretive review
(that based on the value of increased participation in the political process)
can be found within the four corners of the Constitution itself and therefore
presumably ascribed to the intention of the framers. Perry finds this argu-
ment, which relies heavily on the ninth amendment's disclaimer of intent to
disparage rights other than those enumerated,23 ultimately unpersuasive
because the ninth amendment does not clearly authorizejudicial recognition
and enforcement of such rights (p. 22). Perry concludes that there is neither
18. E.g., Perry, Noninterp retive Review in Human Rights Cases: A Functionaljstifka-
lion, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 278 (1971); Perry, Abortion, the Public Morals, and the Police
Power: The Ethical Function of Substantive Due Process, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 689 (1976);
Perry, The Abortion Funding Cases: A Comment on the Supreme Courts Role in American
Government, 66 GEO. L.J. 1191 (1978).
19. See Ely, supra note 6; J. ELY, supra note 13.
20. See general'y R. BERGER, supra note 13.
21. Id at 300.
22. J. ELY, supra note 13, at c.3.
23. Id at 34. The ninth amendment reads as follows: "The enumeration in
the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage
others retained by the people."
[Vol. 48
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historical nor textual support for noninterpretive judicial review and that
the justification must be functional-that is, based on the need for such re-
view and the special qualifications of the judiciary to undertake it (pp. 24-
25).
The main burden of Perry's argument is that such a functional justifi-
cation can be made for noninterpretive review in separation-of-powers cases
(pp. 44-45)24 and in human rights cases (pp. 91-145). Before offering us an
extended exposition of this justification, however, he devotes perhaps a
third of the book to clearing away various inadequate claims made by
others. A number of functional arguments for noninterpretivism are dis-
missed as unpersuasive (pp. 30-36),25 including that for tenth amendment
protection of the states against federal encroachment (pp. 41-45).26 Cases
limiting the power of the states on federalism grounds are deemed un-
problematical because they are not truly noninterpretive, being subject to
congressional redefinition (pp. 38-40).27 Jesse Choper's proposals to jettison
all federalism and separation-of-powers cases as nonjusticiable political
24. Perry points out that there is a need for the Court to resolve interbranch
stalemates to preserve the government's viability, and that in any event the impact
of choosing between politically accountable branches is less damaging than trump-
ing them both would be.
25. Perry deals with the following arguments, among others: (1) that the polit-
ical branches may not be any more responsive to majorities than the judiciary (ac-
countability, not responsiveness, is the test); (2) that "literalism" is impossible (most
interpretivists are not literalists but insist only on confining value judgments to those
of the framers); (3) that the intent of the framers can't always be ascertained (inter-
pretivists accept analogical reasoning); (4) that interpretivism prevents organic in-
terpretation of the Constitution to adapt to new circumstances (the organic
argument is strongest in connection with power-granting provisions such as the com-
merce clause, which require majoritarian exercise, but weakest in connection with
power-limiting provisions such as equal protection, which are antimajoritarian).
26. The leading pre-1937 cases were United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936)
(invalidating the Agricultural Adjustment Act's subsidy for reducing productive
acreage); Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20 (1922) (invalidating federal
tax on employers of child labor); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918) (in-
validating federal child labor laws). In each case, federal laws were found to invade
the states' reserved power to regulate production as distinguished from commerce.
Perry rejects them and the new tenth amendment doctrine of National League of
Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), as lacking in historical or textual foundation
and unnecessary to protect the states, which are adequately represented in the polit-
ical process.
27. The leading modern case is Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761
(1945) (invalidating state law limiting length of trains operating within state as
undue burden on interstate commerce despite absence of any specific federal law
inconsistent with it). See also Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429
(1978) (invalidating state truck length law on similar grounds). The proposition
that the commerce clause embodies a policy of free interstate trade, which Perry
finds unsupported in the adoption history (p. 38), is most clearly articulated in H.P.
1983]
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questions, so as to preserve the Court's institutional capital for individual
rights cases,28 are rejected because they unnecessarily include interpretive re-
view which poses no discemable threat to the Court's effectiveness (pp. 54-
56). Limited concessions by interpretivists of the legitimacy of noninterpre-
tive review in free expression cases29 and in desegregation cases30 are
spumed as no more supported by text, tradition, or consensus than any
other form of noninterpretivism (pp. 66, 69). Similar reasoning disposes of
Ely's elaborate defense of the "representation-enhancing" value31 as a basis
for sustaining activist decisions in the areas of free speech and equal protec-
tion while rejecting "substantive due process" cases like Roe v. Wade (pp. 77-
90).32
Perry takes Robert Bork as his model interpretivist and uses the follow-
ing as a succinct statement of the position: "Courts must accept any value
choice the legislature makes unless it clearly runs contrary to a choice made
in the framing of the Constitution." 33 Perry summarizes his own response
to the various forms of interpretivism:
I prefer to let the framers sleep. Just as the framers, in their day,
judged by their lights, so must we, in our day, judge by ours. This
is not to deny that the framers have anything to say to us, only to
insist that in the end the answers the Court gives are (most often)
its own, and not the framers'. [p. 75].
Having devoted a prologue, introduction, and the first three chapters
of this book to the task of refuting the arguments of others against the inter-
pretivist position, Perry finally comes in chapter 4 to his own argument. He
offers it not as proof that the interpretivists are wrong but as a "reasonable
Hood & Sons, Inc. v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949) (invalidating state denial of
milk receiving station permit to out-of-state processor).
28. J. CHOPER, supra note 17, at 175-76 ("The Federalism Proposal"), 263
("The Separation Proposal"). Choper would retain judicial review of state en-
croachment onfederal powers under the supremacy clause, id at 205, but, like Perry,
characterizes this as not "true judicial review", id. at 206.
29. Bork, supra note 5, at 26 (arguing for the need, in a representative democ-
racy, for open and vigorous debate about officials and their policies).
30. Bork finds that the fourteenth amendment was "intended to enforce a core
idea of black equality" which, in conjunction with the principle of neutrality, sup-
ports Brown's overruling of Plesjy. Bork, supra note 5, at 14-15. Berger concedes
that expectations aroused by the desegregation decisions and "confirmed by every
decent instinct" preclude reversal of Brown although it was wrongly decided as a
matter of judicial legitimacy. R. BERGER, supra note 13, at 412-13.
31. J. ELY, supra note 13, at 87.
32. Perry points out that Ely finds a democratic value implied in the document
as a whole which is at odds with the criteria of representative democracy expressed
there. Perry specifically rejects the distinction between "participational" and
"nonparticipational" values (pp. 119-22).
33. Bork, supra note 5, at 10-11.
[Vol. 48
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alternative"3 4 to interpretivism. He characterizes it as a "functional justifi-
cation" of noninterpretive review (p. 91), which relies not on tradition or
consensus but on "our collective self-understanding" (pp. 93-97),3' and
which is principally applicable in human rights cases. That self-under-
standing, says Perry, consists of two often conflicting elements: (1) democ-
racy, and (2) moral progress. The former is a commitment to policymaking
subject to control by electorally accountable persons; the latter is a commit-
ment to moral evolution, to the notion that we are a "chosen people"
"standing under transcendent judgment" (pp. 97-98). Interpretivism is a
position of moral skepticism, which Perry believes not only to be difficult to
maintain but also to be rejected by most Americans today (pp. 103-05). On
the other hand, the idea that there are right answers to moral questions
does not require that the Constitution be understood as embodying any
particular moral system; an institution passing moral judgment on the prod-
uct of the political process can properly proceed from a theory of "conver-
gence," that the right answer is that given by a variety of moral systems (pp.
109-11). Since the function of subjecting political decisions to moral judg-
ment is not appropriate for the electorally accountable institutions them-
selves, the courts are the institutions best suited for the job (pp. 100-0 1).
In Perry's vision of the role of noninterpretive review in human rights
cases, this calling of the polity to moral account is provisional, not final (p.
99). The courts do not sit wholly apart from the political process but oper-
ate in a dialectical relationship with it (pp. 112-14). Other policymaking
agencies have their say as well; the courts are only one of a number of
checks and balances (p. 126). The crucial question becomes, therefore:
what are the responses available when the Court gives "prophecy"3 6 of
which the polity disapproves? Are there political controls sufficient to the
task of correction, so that noninterpretive review can be reconciled with the
principle of electorally accountable policymaking? Perry is unenlightened
by the hope that the polity will overcome unpopular decisions "in the long
run" and unpersuaded by the claim that failure to correct a particular deci-
sion constitutes acceptance of it (pp. 126-27). He looks instead to institu-
tional controls established by the Constitution itself.
The amendment process is not a sufficient mechanism to vindicate
34. "[M]y aim is less to convert than to establish that my justification is a rea-
sonable one and that, therefore, interpretivism represents only one reasonable con-
stitutional theory and, contrary to what its proponents sometimes claim, not the ony
one." (P. 91). (Emphasis added).
35. He characterizes this self-understanding as "religious in its etymological
sense" (p. 97), derived from the Latin religare, "to bind together that which was
once bound but has since been broken asunder."
36. "An integral component of the American people's religious understanding
of themselves is the notion of prophecy. Invariably a people, even a chosen people,
fail in their responsibility and need to be called to judgment-provisional judg-
ment-in the here and now. That is the task of prophecy. . . ." (P. 98).
1983]
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electorally accountable policymaking because its procedural hurdles are too
high to allow a simple electoral majority to prevail (p. 127). The appoint-
ment process is too imprecise, and must take into account too many polit-
ical factors, to allow for focus on correction of a single decision (p. 127).
The impeachment process is too clumsy to be helpful (p. 128). The judicial
budget is too important to the system as a whole to permit manipulation for
correction of particular decisions (p. 128). 7
In Perry's view, the only political control which is both manipulable by
electoral majorities and precise enough to reach particular decisions is the
power granted by article III, section 2, to regulate the jurisdiction of the
federal courts, including the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court (p.
128). Only by conceding to the political branches the power to remove the
subject matter of an unpopular decision from its jurisdiction can the Court
reconcile its noninterpretive review with the democratic principle (p. 137).
Perry would limit this concession to noninterpretive review, thus pre-
sumably leaving the Court free to invalidate jurisdiction-removing legisla-
tion designed to frustrate a decision which the Court had based on framers'
values (p. 130).3 Although jurisdiction removal is indirect and would not
overrule the offending decision, it can practically neutralize its precedent
value (p. 131) while preserving the institutional independence of the judici-
ary with respect to specific cases. State courts cannot be reached by Con-
gress's jurisdictional controls, to be sure; but they are presumably subject to
state political control and in any event could hardly be regarded as binding
the federal government by a noninterpretive invalidation of federal action,
if the federal judiciary lacked appellate jurisdiction over the state court's
decision (pp. 131-32). The fact that Congress has not actually used this
power since Exparte McCardle39 over 100 years ago, as likely as not, indicates
that its disagreement with controversial decisions is not often so profound as
to justify removing the Court's power to make them (pp. 133-35).4o
Perry believes that the Court would be more candid about the sources
of its decisions if it were to accept both the power of Congress over its juris-
diction and the legitimizing effect such power has on the exercise of
37. On these points Perry cites similar but more extensive discussions by Ely
and Choper. See J. CHOPER, supra note 17, at 49-52; J. ELY, supra note 13, at 46-47.
38. Perry notes that his position is thus consistent with the argument of Hart,
The Power of Congress to Linit the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialec-
tic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362 (1953), that the power must stop short of destroying
"the essential role of the Supreme Court in the constitutional plan," since that role
can only be that of enforcing the values constitutionalized by the framers, i.e., inter-
pretive review (p. 133).
39. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869) (holding that repeal of a jurisdictional statute
deprived the Court ofjurisdiction over a case pending at time of repeal, and that it
could do so under U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2).
40. Choper rejects any inference of acceptance from failure to act and con-
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noninterpretive review (pp. 139-43). That candor, in turn, would en-
courage the legitimate exercise of such political controls as do exist (p. 143).
Then questionable decisions such as Roe v. Wade can be resolved with a
clear conscience-if indeed, which Perry doubts, the polity now disapproves
of them strongly enough to warrant corrective action (pp. 144-45).
Perry's book is the most thorough defense in the current literature, in
terms of constitutional theory, of what is surely -institutional reality: that
the Court often decides cases on the basis of contemporary value judgments
not contemplated by the framers and that public and political response has
various effective channels through which to modify them. It is not the first
to rely on the jurisdiction-controlling power of Congress to reconcile such
value judgments with the democratic principle,4 ' nor is it the first to char-
acterize the Court's more active role as aspirational or prophetic. 42 It has
the virtue, however, of focusing on the question of judicial legitimacy as
such, without attempting to defend the merits of any particular decision.4 3
Its thesis is sounder, in this reviewer's judgment, than those of Ely (who
would limit such review to the single value of representation, which is both
too limiting and too open-ended to help future Courts) and Choper (who
would have the Court abandon major areas of the Constitution to the free
play of electoral politics).
The book's substantive weaknesses flow from its virtues. Defense of a
function allows Perry to avoid deciding what values the Court should be
implementing. Moreover, he does not attempt a theory of interpretation
which would permit us to agree on what values were constitutionalized by
the framers, beyond telling us that none of the Court's controversial deci-
sions can plausibly be defended as interpretive.44 Presumably he thinks this
definition also avoidable when one wishes to justify the broadest range of
judicial review. Nonetheless it zs necessary, because his only limit on the
power of Congress to regulate jurisdiction under article III is that it is not
available to neutralize "interpretive" decisions. Thus the Court will have to
say the last word on the framers' intentions after all, and Perry's book offers
no guidance other than a strong presumption against today's values having
been constitutionalized. For this reason, his invitation to jurisdiction-par-
ing is a sobering one, which we may hope Congress does not enthusiastically
accept. The lesson to be learned from Perry's book, therefore, may well be
cautionary: perhaps the best solution for the Court's political problems
41. See C. BLACK, JR., supra note 17, at 26-27, 37-39.
42. See, for example, the more skeptical appraisal of this role in A. BICKEL,
THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 173-81 (1970).
43. Ely in particular, as a former law clerk to Chief Justice Warren, seeks a
value argument that will justify distinguishing Brown from Roe; he seems to admit
that lack of sympathy for the philosophy of the Burger Court makes him more
receptive to interpretivism. J. ELY, supra note 13, at 3.
44. For a critique of this weakness, see Alexander, Painting Without the Numbers.-
AfoninterpretiveJudidal Review, 8 U. DAYTON L. REV. 447, 454 (1983).
1983]
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would be to rediscover the values of careful analysis and adherence to last-
ing principle, which critics such as Wechsler45 and Bicke4 6 have considered
to be the essence of the judicial craft.
The book also suffers from some stylistic flaws. It is repetitive, in a way
which suggsts that it was originally intended as a series of lectures. It fre-
quently catalogs countervailing arguments only to dismiss them summarily,
leaving the reader helpless to judge independently. However, the lawyer
who is troubled by the issue ofjudicial legitimacy will overlook these blem-
ishes and will find the work well worth reading.
45. See Wechsler, supra note 5.
46. A. BICKEL, supra note 42.
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How TO REPRESENT YOUR CLIENT BEFORE THE IRS. By Bryan Gates.'
New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company. 1983. Pp. 235. $24.95.
In How to Represent Your Client Before the IRS, Bryan Gates gives the
reader a practical guide to the inner workings of the Internal Revenue Serv-
ice. This book contains a substantial amount of information. In addition,
it has a good index, which makes it a valuable reference tool for anyone
who is going to be dealing with the IRS on behalf of a client.
First we are told who can practice before the IRS, how to become qual-
ified to practice, and of what that practice will generally consist. Basically,
one can represent a client before the IRS if he is an attorney, a certified
public accountant, or an enrolled agent (p. 2). The requirements for the
former two classes are fairly well understood. Being an enrolled agent is,
however, unique to the IRS. According to Gates, any person can apply for
this status, the primary requirement being an ability to show technical com-
petence in tax matters (p. 3).
Once representative status is obtained, one can begin to actually prac-
tice before the IRS. This "practice" is defined as making "presentations to
the IRS and its employees relating to client's rights, privileges, or liabilities"
(p. 1).2
Before a representative can do this job effectively, he must have a good
understanding of the system within which he must work. Therefore, we are
provided with an explanation of the organizational structure of the IRS.
Brief job descriptions for the various positions within the IRS structure,
including an explanation of the "expectations" the agency has for its vari-
ous employees, as well as some of the goals and frustrations that those peo-
ple are likely to be experiencing are included in the book. The people who
fill the various positions generally have differing motivations, and it is
pointed out that only by recognizing such elements can one conduct the
most effective representation possible.
The heart of How to Represent Your Client Before the IRS is a discussion of
the various enforcement practices of the IRS. The Author begins by look-
ing at the process for examination of tax returns. While some taxpayers
have their returns selected completely at random, generally an examination
is the result of an IRS computer giving a particular taxpayer's return a high
"discriminant information function" score, the underlying theory being
that if these particular returns are examined, the process is likely to result in
additional revenue (p. 56).'
1. Mr. Gates is a tax representative and an enrolled agent. Much of his exper-
tise in this area is a result of his ten years experience inside the hierarchy of the IRS.
2. REGULATIONS GOVERNING THE PRACTICE OF ATrORNEYS, CERTIFIED
PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS, ENROLLED AGENTS, AND ENROLLED ACTUARIES BEFORE
THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, TRhASURY DEPARTMENT CIRCULAR No. 230,
at 2 (June 1979).
3. An example of such a return might be where taxpayer included 20% of his
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There is a thorough explanation of what an effective representative
should do once his client is caught up in the examination process. We are
told how to help a client who has received a summons from the IRS; when
and how to use the offer in compromise; and what can be done to help a
client who has not paid an amount which the IRS claims is due and for
which the IRS is going to or has set in motion its collection measures of
levy, seizure, or the federal tax lien.
The gravity of having a client under criminal investigation is discussed.
Mr. Gates points out that here "[n]o give and take, no settlement opportu-
nities, and no recognition of taxpayer efforts to cooperate will be involved"
(p. 165). As a consequence, if a taxpayer becomes involved in a criminal
investigation, an effective representative should help his client to find a
good federal criminal defense attorney. There are various things a taxpayer
could do which would result in his coming under criminal investigation-
for instance, willfully failing to file a return on time. All delinquent returns
do not, however, fall into the willful category. The reader is told how to
best handle a situation where a client has been delinquent, but not willfully
SO.
Employment and excise taxes are also discussed. These "trust fund
taxes" are subject to a deposit system whereby the employer/collectors are
required to make payment on a current (often weekly) basis (p. 168). If
such deposits are not made, many of the same procedures for collection are
followed, the difference being that in the trust fund area such procedures
are somewhat more accelerated than they are when the IRS is dealing with
the collection of income taxes (p. 169).
Finally, Mr. Gates makes suggestions as to how one can keep up with
the ever-changing elements of the tax law. Various sources of tax informa-
tion are pointed out and suggestions are made as to their utilization.
How to Represent Your Client Before the IRS is a good reference tool and
would be a valuable addition to the library of anyone who does client repre-
sentation in this area. One of the chapters begins with a quote from Jerome
Kurtz, former Commissioner of the IRS: "[W]hile we wish for simplicity,
we must administer complexity" (p. 194). This statement effectively sums
up the revenue collection process and the agency that does that collection.
One who must deal with this process on behalf of a client needs to under-
stand the complexities. How to Represent Your Client Before the IRS does much
to aid in this goal.
gross income as a charitable contribution. It is possible that taxpayer was really this
generous, but since his percentage of giving is quite a bit more than the norm, such
a contribution might well trigger an examination.
[Vol. 48
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THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE. Edited by David
Kaiys.' New York: Pantheon Books. 1982. Pp. 321. $9.95.
The United States places great emphasis on democracy. Yet a great
number of society's important decisions are made by nonmajoritarian
courts. Society justifies this by a perception that the decisionmaking pro-
cess is purely objective. According to this perception, a judge bases his deci-
sion on clearly outlined rules of law which are applied to a set of facts to
reach the correct result.
This analysis, according to David Kairys in the Introduction to The
Politics of Law.- A Progressive Critique, is an idealized model of the judicial
process which fails to recognize the social and political content of law. The
Politics of Law is a collection of essays which rejects this idealized model.
Rather than criticizing the legal system for deviating from a distinct mode
of legal reasoning, these authors claim that unbiased legal reasoning is a
myth. This myth gives the law its power by legitimizing the court's domi-
nance which in turn legitimizes domination by a small corporatized elite.
This collection of essays describes the legitimization process in selected sub-
stantive issues and fields of law and the resulting dominance. The book is
divided into three parts. Part One considers the idealized model and in-
cludes an analysis of legal education. Part Two consists of ten essays which
deal with social and political impact on the law by focusing on major social
and legal issues and specific fields of law. Part Three suggests a variety of
progressive approaches to the law.
Each essay presents a progressive, critical analysis which Kairys ac-
knowledges is drawn from Marxist thought. An analysis of the legal system
from this perspective is a provocative approach rarely presented by legal
texts or traditional legal writings. In the first essay, Kairys uses a trio of
United States Supreme Court cases dealing with free speech rights in pri-
vately owned shopping centers to illustrate the problems in justifying deci-
sions by claiming a duty to follow precedent.2 Rather than relying on stare
decisis, Kairys emphasizes the need to understand the role of public policy
in the decisionmaking process.
1. Kairys, Rudovsky & Maguinan, Philadelphia, Pa.
2. In Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza,
391 U.S. 308 (1968), the Court upheld the constitutional right of union members to
picket a store involved in a labor dispute in the shopping center where it was lo-
cated. Four years later, Lloyd v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972), held that an antiwar
activist had no constitutional right to distribute pamphlets in a shopping center.
The Lloyd Court distinguished Logan Valle , by noting that a labor dispute is more
closely related to the activities of a shopping center than is antiwar activity. Fi-
nally, in Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976), the Court held that union mem-
bers involved in a labor dispute with a store in a shopping center do not have a
constitutional right to picket in the center. The reason given for not following Logan
Valle, was that it had been overturned by Lloyd. The Court said it must follow
Lloyd's precedent.
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The chapter on the "History of the Mainstream Legal Thought" ana-
lyzes the development of law and economics and suggests that the common
law has traditionally followed the market "under the guise of protecting
rights" (p. 37).3 The essay which deals with legal education presents a high-
ly critical view of the function of law schools and the hierarchical system
they develop. The author claims that schools, in a number of specific ways,
purposefully incapacitate students to enter jobs other than those relegated
to them according to their standing in the hierarchy of schools. In addition,
the essay deals with the manner in which teachers model for students the
proper hierarchy of the legal system.
The second part of The Politics of Law deals specifically with the
claimed injustice law creates when applied to labor, race and sex discrimi-
nation, free speech, contracts, torts, the criminal system, and welfare bene-
fits. According to Richard L. Abel in his essay on "Torts", "tort law under
capitalism equates money with labor, possessions, care, emotional and phys-
ical integrity, and ultimately love." (P. 87). His theory is that under capi-
talism labor must be sold for wages, so compensation for injury becomes loss
of earning capacity. In addition, mass production makes money the
equivalent of any chattel, and money is therefore adequate compensation
for loss of any possessions. As the family dissolves, medical care can only be
provided outside the home so that even physical injuries "cost" money.
This logic extends to equating money with emotional distress and loss of
consortium.
Tort law is a means for the dominant class of lawyers to protect the
property of the capitalist and the monopoly of expertise of the lawyer, ac-
cording to Abel. This is done by the lawyer combining his expertise with
the victim's injury "to product a tort (a commodity) that has exchange
value both in the state-created market (the court) and in the dependent
market it spawns (negotiated settlements)." (P. 188). In the end the victim
receives only the essentials and the rest is the lawyer's fee, which Abel
claims is the capitalists' expropriation of surplus value.
Tort law, in addition, furthers the capitalistic need to expand its mar-
ket and increase consumption. Injury must be fostered due to this expan-
sionistic approach, and the tort doctrines of contributory negligence, the
fellow-servant rule, and assumption of risk, allow capitalists to sacrifice the
health and safety of others.4
Abel suggests a socialist approach to illness and injury. He recognizes
that the primary requirement to implement this approach is a radical
3. See, e.g., Michelman, Norms and Nonnativity in the Economic Theo,7 of Law, 62
MINN. L. REV. 1015 (1978).
4. This effect of tort law on the safety of the workplace is obvious, according
to Abel, in Judge Learned Hand's formula weighing the costs of accident avoidance
against the costs of injury discounted by its probability. See United States v. Carroll
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change in the division of labor. This is a traditional socialist requirement-
that the workers gain control over the means of production. He does not
advocate nationalizing industry, which he claims would only substitute the
state for capital, but rather suggests cooperative enterprises and worker in-
volvement in improving health and safety in the workplace. Abel further
advocates ending compensation for non-pecuniary loss since this maintains
inequalities in wealth and income and encourages the treatment of love and
experience as commodities.
5
The essays in Part Two each critique a specific body of law and in-
clude the author's suggestions for improvement. These specific suggestions
are followed by a group of essays in Part Three advocating general ap-
proaches to reform of our legal system. Robert W. Gordon, in the first of
these essays, emphasizes the need for a change in the individual's belief-
system.6 Gordon, a law professor, states that the current belief-system that
the many hierarchical relations in society are natural and necessary rein-
forces the current legal system. Our legal system is seen as just one of the
hierarchical systems which are natural and necessary. Rather than at-
tempting to change the systems, people accept them and try to work within
the belief that the structures must remain the same. According to Gordon,
these conventional beliefs must be exposed through our own rational intel-
lectual inquiry and by a realization that history, not nature, is the basis for
these structures.
Victor Rabinowitz ends the collection with a positive view of the po-
tential of our legal system. The New York lawyer states that the most criti-
cal "orthodox" Marxist view-"The Law, while pretending to be a benign,
neutral force dispensing justice, equality, and due process, actually is but a
fraudulent cover-up for the force through which the State rules," (p.
312) 7 -- is error that tends to encourage cynicism and ignore the battle of
many persons for progressive, socially desirable laws. Rabinowitz points to
areas of the law in which progress has been made to better the lives of the
working class. He states that due to a number of recent United States
Supreme Court decisions, individuals charged with crimes now have more
protection than they had previously.8 Looking at the more distant past, he
points out the effect of factory and child labor laws, the recognition by the
5. For further development of these proposals, Abel recommends his article,
Abel, A Socialist Approach to Risk, 41 MD. L. REV. 695 (1982).
6. The process of building a belief-structure is termed "reification." See gener-
aly 3 P. GABEL, REIFICATION IN LEGAL REASONING, RESEARCH IN LAW AND SOCI-
OLOGY (1980).
7. For this orthodox view, Rabinowitz relies in part on a militant lawyer's
writings in LAw AGAINST THE PEOPLE (G. Lefcourt ed. 1971).
8. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (capital punishment held un-
constitutional in 41 states); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (persons in
custody must be advised of rights); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)
(those charged with serious crimes are entitled to a lawyer); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643 (1961) (illegally seized evidence inadmissible in court).
1983]
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state of labor unions, and the progress in the struggle for the rights of mi-
norities. In these areas he claims there is little support for the allegation
that the purpose of these changes was to better the capitalist system. In-
stead he claims that the law develops a life of its own, independent of capi-
talism, due to the pressure of the people for a more bearable existence.
Although the legal system will strengthen class relations and mask injustices
to some extent, Rabinowitz's solution is to use the law as a vehicle to force
the state to keep its promises to the people.
The authors contributing to this collection of essays develop a coherent
critique of our legal system. They demonstrate a thorough knowledge of
the development of our legal system as well as the substantive fields dis-
cussed. Their formulation of an alternative theory is not as thorough nor as
coherent as the critiques they develop. Although The Politics of Law." A
Progressive Critique may not have a clear solution to the problems facing our
legal system, it will raise questions in the minds of today's lawyers and cre-
ate an awareness of the problems facing the system in which they must
function.
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